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Foreign patents surge and technology spillovers in China: evidences from the 
patent market and trade market in 1985-2009 
 
ABSTRACT：  
The paper investigates the determinants of foreign patent surge and the effects of technology 
spillovers in China based on an industry-level sample of 19 countries and regions from 1985 to 
2009. We explore two hypotheses to explain the increasing foreign propensity to patent and the 
effects of technology spillovers in China, the market covering hypotheses and competitive 
threat hypotheses. The results show strong support for the competitive threat hypothesis. 
However, the foreign patenting surge in China does not mean China has more access to 
outsource advanced technology; on the contrary the technology spillover from foreign countries 
in China is limited. 
 
 

















Over the past two decades, global patenting practice appears to have been active,  with a  
9% annual growth rate by U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) patent applications 
(USPTO, 2007), and nearly 35% by China’s State Intellectual Property Office (SIPO) patent 
applications (SIPO, 2010). Since the growth of foreign patent applications by SIPO is far more 
than that in the foreign inventors’ home countries, it seems that China has become the country 
with the best patent protection for foreign inventors. From 1993 to 2008, the top five foreign 
countries patents granted in China were Japan, the United States, Germany, South Korea and 
France (accounting for 80% of all total foreign patents), and the average annual growth rate for 
the five countries was 17.45% by SIPO, comparing to only  -3.83% by USPTO. However, in 
1986-1992, the five countries’ USPTO patent granted growth rate (3.13%) was higher than that 
of SIPO (0.77%), as shown in Table 1. Moreover, there are several obvious national and 
industrial level features of the foreign patent applications and grants in China. In term of 
national patent distribution, there was a rise in the number of countries applying for patents in 
China and granted patents by SIPO, from 66 in 1988-1992 to 135 in 2010, but there existed a 
predominantly concentration in several countries. From 1985 to 1992, the top five countries 
accounted for 87.7% of all patent grants, but in period of 2002-2010, the figure increased to 
95.6%. In term of industrial patent distribution, the top five countries identified above showed 
some differences between SIPO and USPTO. 
. Introduction 
Over the past two decades, global patenting practice appears to have been active,  with a  9% 
annual growth rate by U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) patent applications (USPTO, 
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2007), and nearly 35% by China’s State Intellectual Property Office (SIPO) ①patent applications 
(SIPO, 2010). Since the growth of foreign patent applications by SIPO is far more than that in 
the foreign inventors’ home countries, it seems that China has become the country with the best 
patent protection for foreign inventors. From 1993 to 2008, the top five foreign countries patents 
granted in China were Japan, the United States, Germany, South Korea and France (accounting 
for 80% of all total foreign patents), and the average annual growth rate for the five countries 
was 17.45% by SIPO, comparing to only  -3.83% by USPTO. However, in 1986-1992, the five 
countries’ USPTO patent granted growth rate (3.13%) was higher than that of SIPO (0.77%), as 
shown in Table 1. Moreover, there are several obvious national and industrial level features of 
the foreign patent applications and grants in China. In term of national patent distribution, 
there was a rise in the number of countries applying for patents in China and granted patents 
by SIPO, from 66 in 1988-1992 to 135 in 2010, but there existed a predominantly concentration 
in several countries. From 1985 to 1992, the top five countries accounted for 87.7% of all patent 
grants, but in period of 2002-2010, the figure increased to 95.6% and remained relatively stable 
in the following years. In term of industrial patent distribution, the top five countries identified 
above showed some differences between SIPO and USPTO. 
 
 
Table 1. The growth rate of patent applications for five countries in USPTO and SIPO 
  USPTO SIPO 
                                                             
① Following a recent restructuring, the former State Intellectual Property Office of China (SIPO) 
was renamed to China National Intellectual Property Administration, abbreviated as CNIPA, 
on 28 August 2018. 
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Country 1986-1992 1993-2001 2002-2008 1993-2008 1986-1992 1993-2001 2002-2008 1993-2008 
France 
1.63% 2.78% -24.95% -10.76% 1.85% 20.48% 7.92% 16.20% 
Germany 
-0.05% 5.16% -23.35% -8.92% 0.83% 18.36% 11.73% 16.05% 
Japan 
4.54% 4.87% -19.11% -6.46% -2.85% 26.41% 8.43% 20.39% 
Korea 
38.17% 16.01% -13.21% 3.56% 31.03% 25.19% 11.78% 22.09% 
US 
2.81% 6.83% -13.48% -2.63% 1.87% 16.50% 10.13% 13.95% 
Five- 
countries 
Average②  3.13% 6.29% -15.36% -3.83% 0.77% 21.27% 9.50% 17.45% 
China③ 
14.36% 26.65% 7.91% 20.68% 13.70% 8.43% 24.72% 17.49% 
Sources:   OECD patent statistical database and the SIPO website. 
The sharp increase of foreign patent applications in China causes our study seek to develop 
an approach to solve a significant patents surge puzzle: why are foreign investors keen to apply 
for patents in China?  Furthermore, the desire for advanced technology in China is reflected in 
the pursuit of patents.  It seems to ignore the more important issues of foreign patenting in 
China: does this phenomenon of foreign patenting surge in China mean more technology 
spillovers? China as the research context for our study is considered to be more uncertain and 
unpredictable (Burgers & Padgett 2009). The gradual development of China's legal intellectual 
property regime (Howse, 2011), the largest FDI recipient (Peng, 2006) and the Chinese trade 
market provides a unique environment for the patents surge and an excellent research context 
to capture the complexity of foreign patents surge and technology spillovers.  
To address this research gap, this study investigates two hypotheses: the market covering 
hypothesis and competitive threat hypothesis, to analysis the increasing foreign propensity to 
patent in China and argues the possible effects on technology spillovers in the perspective of 
                                                             
② The average is five- countries weighted average, where weight is the proportion of the number of 
patent application. 
③ China refers to Mainland China, which does not cover Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan, where 
different economic and legal systems are in operation, despite the fact that they are legally recognized as 
indispensable parts of the State of China 
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technology proximity. This research provides new insights on foreign patent surge and the 
effects of technology spillovers in emerging market. We contribute theoretically to the extant 
literature on Propensity to Patent (Hu, 2009) by integrating technology proximity on spillovers 
and competition and China’s Foreign Patenting Surge. Meanwhile, we contribute 
methodologically via merging all the industry level patents in China from SIPO and USPTO 
covering 19 countries and regions from 1985 to 2009 comparing fix effects (FE) and 
generalized method of moment (GMM) panel analysis for the scenario.  In response to the 
contributions on practice, patents surge   in China is a significant and growing economic 
phenomenon that is of timely concern to policymaking and managers who can take the two 
conditions into consideration the relationship between foreign patents and technology 
spillovers in Chinese market.    
2. Literature Review 
        The explosive growth of foreign patents in China has attracted economists’ and innovation 
scholars’ attention (Wu and Liu, 2004; Yang and Clarke, 2005; O’Keeffe, 2005; Hu & Jefferson, 
2009; Li, 2009). Hu and Jefferson（2009）analysed the factors influencing foreign patent 
propensity in China, including foreign direct investment, conducive patent legislation and the 
reform of the ownership system. Zhang and Rogers (2009) argued that the rapid growth of 
foreign direct investment and trade contributed to the increase of foreign patents in China. Hu 
(2010) viewed the sharp increase of foreign patents as a reaction to the continuous 
encouragement and support for domestic innovation under the Chinese national innovation 
system. Liu and Chen (2010) and Sun (2008) also discussed the effects of various factors on 
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growth of foreign patents in China, such as technical innovation ability, investment and trade. 
The motivation for applying for a patent in foreign countries has been in extensive 
discussion. Factors influencing foreign patenting include the quality or value of patents, 
diffusion rate, patent cost and market size（Eaton & Kortum, 1999）. Foreign direct 
investment, imports, and geographical distance between countries are also important 
considerations for patent application in a foreign country（Bosworth, 1980; Rashid, 2009）. 
Patent reform and related institutional changes, such as powerful fusion of the patent system 
and patent law, greatly inspire foreign patenting activities (Kortum & Lerner, 1999; Lerner, 
2002). Private property protection, trade facilitation and the degree of marketization also 
influence international patent inflows (Xu & Chiang, 2005; Deng & Liao, 2010). In field of the 
modern international business, patent acts not only as an important source of profits, but also 
as a defense tool. Owning patents with the cutting-edge technology means more access to 
foreign markets (Cohen et al., 2002). The controls and trades concerning patents also strengthen 
companies’ abilities of entering foreign markets. If two or more parties of the transaction have 
some specific advantage in a certain technical field, they are likely to form international 
strategic alliances, which would benefit the technical progress of international partners 
(Grindley & Teece, 1997; Cohen et al., 2000). New international business theory points out that 
as an international strategy foreign patenting depends on the company's understanding of 
international opportunities. For example, in order to ensure the relationship with suppliers and 
manufacturers, a company may use the patent license or cross licensing to enhance 
its negotiating power in the market (Oviatt & McDougall, 1994; Knight & Cavusgil, 1996; Bell 
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et al., 2004).  
Influenced by these studies to a large extent, some new trends have appeared in the 
researches on the foreign patent surge in China. For example, Yang（2012）explained that the 
imitation and innovation threats from local domestic enterprises is an important reason for 
foreign patenting in China. Keupp et al. (2010) argued that the driving forces of foreign patent 
applications in China are not only from industry level, but also from firm level. Based on the 
analysis of patents activities in 11 multinational corporates in China, Keupp et al. (2012) 
pointed out that there is no single dominant motivation for multinational companies to apply 
for patents in an emerging nation with weak intellectual property protection such as China. 
Obviously, there exist some important differences between the analysis at firm level and the 
one at national level (Sun, 2003; Hu, 2010, Hu & Jefferson, 2009). The complexity of firms’ 
samples affects the explanatory power of the models used and the applicability of research 
conclusions. Besides, arguments regarding the institutional aspect have also highlighted that, 
although the international coordination process of intellectual property protection has 
accelerated, China's intellectual property protection is still not mature enough (Li, 2012; Keupp 
et al., 2012). 
New international business theory has made us realized that it is not enough to just focus on 
country level analysis, and further complementary research on industry, even firm level is 
necessary. Also, theoretically, the system of Chinese intellectual property rights protection may 
not be fully mature, but the rapid development and substantial potentiality of Chinese patent 
market has provided a perspective for the study of patents strategies and decisions. In this paper, 
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we implement and enrich the market competitive threat theory as well as market covering 
theory by making use of industry level data of different countries. We analyze the competition 
situation of trade markets and patent markets, discuss the factors causing foreign patenting 
surge in local market, and conclude with proximity index analysis that this surge may have 
negative effects on technology spillover in China. 
3. Hypotheses, Data and a Preliminary Analysis 
3.1 Hypothesis development  
Although foreign patenting may face risk in every aspect, such as application, translation, 
maintenance, infringement and implementation, it is necessary for foreign firms to protect local 
market sales and technical invention. Patent control can help to maintain a competitive 
advantage by updating the enterprise’s core and peripheral technology (Eaton & Kortum, 1999). 
As foreign firms are accelerating entry into the Chinese market via various ways, including 
trade, license and direct investment, the risk of their intellectual property being imitated 
increases. At the same time, the demand to bring the latest and the most advanced 
technology into Chinese market is also growing. All these integrating into the Chinese market 
leads to continual increase in the patenting tendency in China, which is the market covering 
hypothesis. The bigger market share or covering in the Chinese local market, the more a foreign 
firm patents in China. The larger market share means the higher possibilities of products or 
services exposure to the local market, and perhaps the higher risks of being imitated. However, 
the competitive threat hypothesis suggests that the willingness of a foreign company to apply 
for a patent in China depends on its competitors' patent decisions (Cohen, 2000). Patent 
application in China can help a foreign company ensure returns in the Chinese market from a 
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specific technology. The returns or the premiums depend on whether there exists a comparable 
technology from a competitive foreign firm or a Chinese local enterprise. Due to the more 
effective imitation and innovation from competitors, and the introduction of new technology in 
some other more active regions, foreign firms are likely to increase patent activity in China. To 
some extent, patent behavior of foreign firms in China is a response to the Chinese market and 
to the Chinese enterprises’ patent behavior. Based on aggregate patent statistics, Hu (2010) 
found the competition threat hypothesis could explain foreign patent behavior in China. Based 
on survey data at enterprise level, Keupp et al., (2012) suggested these two hypotheses operated 
at the same time. 
3.2 Data and sample  
The sample in our paper involves 19 countries and regions; they are Australia, Austria, Canada, 
Denmark, Italy, Finland, France, Germany, Japan, South Korea, the Netherlands, Spain, 
Switzerland, Sweden, United Kingdom, Singapore, the United States, Taiwan and Hong Kong, 
and China. The industries patent data from different countries and regions in China is from 
the Star Patent Retrieval System of the Chinese patent information center in SIPO, from which 
the number of patent applications④ can be derived through retrieving countries and regions, IPC 
classification and time. Our sample data includes only applications for invention patents and 
utility model patents⑤.  American patent data for different countries and regions come from the 
USPTO patent grant number (no application numbers are contained in this database). China 
                                                             
④ Due to time delay existing in the application and grant, compared with the grant data, application data can be 
more representative of the technology or innovation development trend. 
⑤ In China, there are three types of patent: invention, utilities model and design, but it was not possible to obtain 
complete data for design patents.  
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imports trade data from different countries and regions with the industry ISIC (rev. 3) 
classification standard is from the STAN bilateral trade database of the OECD. 
Due to import data and patent data being subject to different industrial classification standards, 
it is necessary to match and unify them into one classification. This paper uses the coordination 
method from Schmoch et al (2003) for reference, and makes the international patent 
classification (IPC) and industrial classification (ISIC rev. 3) respectively associated with 44 
specific industries. We first classified the patent data into 44 industries, then considering the 
availability and completeness of the import data, we reduced the number of specific industries 
from 44 to 18. The industry coordination and comparison are shown in Appendix A.  
3.3 A preliminary investigation of foreign patent applications in China 
Patents application in foreign market can reflect the scale of research activities in the applicant’s 
home nation（Eaton & Kortum, 1999. Foreign patent application in China depends on the 
innovation abilities of foreign inventors. As America is one of the world's most dynamic 
technology markets, originators of a foreign invention with great market potential will consider 
seeking protection in the US. Therefore, we can use the number of patent grants in the US 
Intellectual Property Office to represent the innovation performance of a country, which could 
eliminate national bias and the differences in patent systems for different countries’ patent 
applications. Foreign patent applications in China also depend on the patent propensity of 
foreign inventors in China (Hu, 2010).   
   𝑆𝐼𝑃𝑂k,j,t = f(𝑈𝑆𝑃𝑇𝑂k,j,t, Pk,j,t
C )                                               (1) 
Equation (1) is used as a model for the influence factors of foreign patenting in China, where 
 𝑆𝐼𝑃𝑂k,j,t   ,  𝑈𝑆𝑃𝑇𝑂k,j,t   and   Pk,j,t
C   are   the number of patent applications in China,   the number 
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of patent grants in the US and the patent propensity in China, respectively;  k, t and j denote 
country, year  and  industry.  
In fact, the foreign patent propensity in China for a country depends on several factors: the 
number of patent application in China including all countries and regions, the number of all 
countries and regions' patent grants in the US, and the number of domestic new utility patent 
applications in China. Since China’s new patent regime came into force in 2001, reform of the 
patent legal system may significantly affect the foreign patent propensity. Considering the 
above factors, the following equation (2) is defined as log linear of equation (1).  




) + ∑ βnln (𝑈𝑆𝑃𝑇𝑂n,j,t
8
n=1 ) + γln (𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎_Uj,t) + δ 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡+ϑk,j,t         (2) 
Where, 𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎_Uj,t  is the number of the domestic new utility model patents applications in China,  
𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 is an Institutional dummy variable, which takes the value one for Post-2001 (2001-
2009); and zero, for  pre - 2001(1995-2000). 𝜗𝑘,𝑗,𝑡 is the iid error term; k, t and j denote country, 
year and industry, respectively.  
We select 8 countries and regions (France, Germany, Japan, South Korea, US, Taiwan, China 
and Finland) as our study samples, and the sample period is from 1995 to 2009. With reference 
to the method of Schmoch et al., (2003), we coordinate the international patent classification 
(IPC) and industry classification (ISIC Rev.3) together to 44 industries, that is, the value of j 
ranges from 1 to 44 in our paper. The analysis result of Equation (2) is shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 2.  Preliminary study of factors influencing foreign patent in China in 1995-2009 



















SIPO_China - - 0.193** 0.351** 0.084 0.374** 0.156** 0.189** 0.08 
12 
 
China_U - - 
-
0.172** 




- 0.213** 0.452** 0.107 0.175** 0.142* 0.052 
SIPO_Germany 0.281** 0.148* 0.138** - 0.204** -0.009 0.213** 0.115* 
-
0.184** 
SIPO_France 0.055 0.102 0.198** 0.138** - 0.159* 0.035 0.016 0.165** 
SIPO_Finland 0.086** 0.052 0.02 -0.003 0.067* - 0.023 0.013 0.095** 
SIPO_Japan 0.284** 0.514** 0.216** 0.403** 0.099 0.152 - 0.203** 0.286** 
SIPO_Korea 0.115** 0.153** 0.063* 0.078* 0.016 0.032 0.073** - 0.164** 
SIPO_Taiwan 0.05 0.061 0.024 
-
0.133** 
0.177** 0.240** 0.109** 0.173** - 






















USPTO_France -0.012 -0.072 -0.070* 
-
0.134** 
0.393** -0.013 -0.028 -0.08 -0.161* 
USPTO_Finland 0.017 0.059 
-
0.057** 



















0.608** -0.023 0.104** -0.104* -0.074 0.005 -0.051 0.422** 
Institution 0.230** 0.251 0.04 -0.134 -0.230* -0.081 0.266** -0.199* 0.482** 
Obs. 645 645 645 645 645 645 645 645 645 
R square 0.889 0.745 0.917 0.879 0.864 0.716 0.946 0.89 0.878 
Note 1: SIPO_USA represents US patent applications in the China Patent Intellectual Property Office. 
USPTO_USA represents the US patent grant in the United State Patent and Trademark Office. The 
corresponding variables of other countries and regions are similar.  
        The data for 44 industries is incomplete; we only have data for 43 industries here.   
Note 2: ** significant at 5% level; * significant at the 10% level. 
 
The first two columns of Table 2 shows that the domestic invention patents in China have a 
significantly positive relationship with most foreign patent applications (such as USA, German, 
Finland, Japan and South Korea) in China, but domestic new utility model patents are positively 
and significantly related with Japan and South Korea. The third to the tenth columns of Table 
2 finds that most foreign countries’ and regions’ patent applications are significant positively 
related with domestic patent applications in China. Furthermore, except Finland, foreign 
countries patent applications in China are also correlated with each other. Table 2 also shows 
the correlation between patent application in China and patent grants in the USA for the eight 
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countries and regions. There is a competitive trade-off relationship among the eight countries 
and regions in US patent grants (a significant negative correlation), such as America and 
Finland, Germany and France, and Japan with America and Germany, which shows the intense 
competition in the global patent market. From the lower left diagonal position in the table, for 
all countries including China, their patent application in China is significantly correlated with 
their patent grant in USA, and the elasticity of most countries (except China) is around 0.5. 
Patent grant in America to a great extent indicates a country's innovation abilities, and thus the 
self-innovation of a country is an important impetus supporting foreign patent activities. It is 
worthwhile to note that, although Chinese patent application is significantly correlated with 
patent grant in US, the value of 0.152 is far less than that of the other countries. 
Next, we investigated a longer period of 1986-2009 and the results appear in Appendix B. The 
results show an obvious influence of the institutional variable, which significant impacts for 
China, USA, Japan and Taiwan. In July 2001, before China joined the WTO, China’s second 
amendment of the patent law came into force, which broadened the scope of patent protection 
and strengthened enforcement mechanism. Compared with the empirical results of 1995-2009, 
the results of other variables are the same generally, with only a few differences. A possible 
reason for the difference may be the position of South Korea. South Korean patent applications 
in China ranked fourteenth in the period of 1986-1992, but leaped to fourth in the period of 
1993-2001. Therefore, the result covering the two periods may be more complex. 
4. Empirical analysis 
On the basis of the preliminary study, the following part is to test whether the market covering 
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hypothesis or competition threat hypothesis is supported, investigating whether the threat of 
participation and competition in Chinese market decides foreign patenting behavior. Hu (2010) 
replaced the degree of participation and competition of different countries and regions in the 
Chinese market with Chinese import industry data, this indicator views the Chinese market as 
the final export destination. Similarly, we differentiate the import data into two categories: one 
is  𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑘,𝑗,𝑡 , representing China's total imports from foreign industry, where  k, j, t  again 
denote country, industry, and year respectively. The other is 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟_𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡
𝑘,𝑗,𝑡
 , representing 
China's total imports for all countries and regions except country k. Further,  𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟_𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑘,𝑗,𝑡 
is measured by two different indicators. One is 𝑇𝐼𝑘,𝑗,𝑡 , representing China's total un-weighted 
imports for all the other countries and regions except country k; the second is 𝐶𝐼𝑘,𝑗,𝑡 , 
representing China's total weighted imports for all the other countries and regions except 
country k, with the weight TPk,l,j,t , where  TPk,l,j,t is the technology proximity (TP)  between 
country k and country l that  exports to China in an industry-year. The technology proximity 
between two foreign industries is computed as an un-centered correlation between the patent 
distributions over 44 industries. The definitions of 𝑇𝐼𝑘,𝑗,𝑡  and 𝐶𝐼𝑘,𝑗,𝑡 are shown in Equation (3) 
and Equation (4) respectively.  
We consider the competition in Chinese import market, as well the patent market. According to 
the results from Table 2, we take the number of a foreign country’s patent grants in USPTO 
(𝑈𝑆𝑃𝑇𝑂𝑘,𝑗,𝑡), the number of domestic invention patent applications in China (𝑃𝑐𝑗,𝑡), and the 
number of domestic new utility patent applications (𝑈𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑗,𝑡) in China as the independent 
variables. Considering the prevailing competition between countries and regions in the Chinese 
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market, we also include the total number of patents from the other countries and regions except 
country k (𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟_𝑠𝑖𝑝𝑜𝑘,𝑗,𝑡) as an independent variable in the model. Because the technology 
development is mostly accumulative and path-dependent, the level of patent application in 
China may depend on its previous level. We therefore introduce the first order lag term to extend 
the model to be a dynamic model, in order to prevent the setting bias and error of the basic 
model. The complete dynamic panel of the log linear model is shown as Equation（5）. 
TIk,j,t = ∑ Importl,j,tl≠k                                                       (3) 
  CIk,j,t = ∑ TPk,l,j,tImportl,j,tl≠k  ，TPk.l.j.t = (V′k,j,tVl,j,t)/ (√V′k,j,tVk,j,t√V′l,j,tVl,j,t)            (4) 
ln (SIPOk,j,t) = α + β0lnSIPOk,j,t−1＋β1ln (Importk,j,t) + β2ln (Other_importk,j,t) +
β3 ln (Other_sipok,j,t  )  + β4ln (USPTOk,j,t) + β5ln (Pcj,t) + β6ln (Utilityj,t) + β7 Institution𝑡 + μk,j,t                  
（5） 
Where, k, j and t again denote country, industry, and year respectively. Vk,j,t is a vector of patent 
class shares of country k’s SIPO patent applications in year t and k is 19 countries and regions 
(not including China), the time period ranges from 1995 to 2008, and the value of industry j 
ranges from 1 to 18, as shown in Appendix A. The institutional dummy variable Institutiont is 
defined as in Equation (2). μk,j,t  is the error term. 
Equation (5) is a dynamic panel model, and the lag of the dependent variables is related with 
the fixed effects of non-observed individual country in this model, which leads to the result of 
the pooled OLS estimation and fixed effects estimation being biased. Arellano & Bond (1991) 
provide an alternative way to estimate equation (5), which is difference-GMM. The basic 
estimation strategy is to assume that the error term in equation (5) satisfies: 
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Cov(μk,j,t, μk,j.t−1) = 0, Cov(∆μk,j,t, ∆μk,j.t−1) ≠ 0, Cov(∆μk,j,t, ∆μk,j.t−m) = 0, m ≥ 2  
Where  ∆μk,j,t = μk,j,t − μk,j,t−1. 
Table 3 provides a number of diagnostic statistics to verify the validity of the model and the 
instruments. We use all lags that are more than two periods old as instruments for the first 
differences. The Sargan over-identification test indicates we are unable to reject the null 
hypothesis that the instruments are collectively valid at the 5% significance level. By model 
construction and assumption, the error terms are correlated to the first order, but not the second 
order, the AR (1), AR(2) and AR(3) test statistics confirm this at the 1% significance level.  
The results of GMM estimation in Table 3 show that China’s imports from a country have 
a significant negative impact on the patent application of that country in China. This is different 
from the expectation of the market share hypothesis. A possible explanation is that a strong 
market power brought with a large market share reduces the competition, hence reducing patent 
activities in China, which probably supports the competitive threat hypothesis. The total 
imports that China imports from other countries (the competitive nations) except country k, 
have a significant positive impact on country k’s patent applications in China, no matter 
whether the total imports are weighted based on the technological similarity with the patent 
classified technology measurement in the two countries. The influence coefficient is higher 
when considering the weighted factor of competition in the same industry. The findings all 
directly support the competition threat hypothesis. Patent grants in the USA and the patent 
applications of other competitive countries in China, significantly positively influence each 
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other. This supports our previous analysis. It is worthwhile to note that domestic invention 
patent applications in China did not significantly affect the patent behavior of foreign countries, 
and domestic new utility patent applications in China had a significant negative effect. From a 
dynamic perspective, taking all the factors into account, increase in domestic new utility model 
patent applications in China actually means a lower level of substantial competition in the 
patent market, thus weakening the foreign patent activity in China. The reform of the patent 
system in China has a significant positive effect on foreign patent applications in China. This 
is consistent with the conclusion of some other literature.  As expected, patent applications in 
China have a significant positive associated with previous impact on the last year's patent 
applications. From results of dynamic GMM model, it can be seen the competitive threat 
hypothesis is verified, whereas the market covering hypothesis is not supported.  
For comparison purpose, we also use a fixed effects panel data model to estimate equation 
(5), without considering the patent application time accumulation and path-dependence, 
considering only the fixed effects of country and time there is no need to consider the effect of 
the specific reform of the patent system in China now. The empirical results are reported in 
Table 3. The Hausman test confirms that we should reject the random effect model and accept 
the fixed effect model. We find these results are consistent with the estimation result of a 
dynamic GMM, differing only in significance, namely, the market covering hypothesis does 
not hold.   
Table 3. The influence factors of foreign patent application in China 
 GMM  model 
Fixed- effects  model 
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Hausman test 
 








Model selection - - Fixed effect Fixed effect Fixed effect Fixed effect 
R square - - 0.9875 0.9875 0.9839 0.9838 
Obs. 4446 4446 4446 4446 4788 4788 
Note 1: p-values in parentheses. *** Significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level;* 
significant at the 10% level. 
Note 2: Estimates of country dummies and time dummies are not reported but they are available on 
request. 
     The results in Table 3 show, on the one hand, that the fierce competition among   foreign 
counter’s for sales in the Chinese market explains the foreign propensity to patent in China; 
the larger the sales of competitor countries in China, the more incentive there is for foreign 
patent activity in China. Foreign patenting in China is strategic preemption behaviour for 
preventing and impeding the competitors, which may hinder technology spillovers, in contrast 
to the market covering hypothesis with a large amount of new invention technology introduced 
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in the Chinese market. As mentioned earlier, the immaturity of China's proprietary system 
makes the protection of patents limited. What need to be more considered in patent application 
in China, are competitors (from China and other countries) in the Chinese market, rather than 
imitators. Faced with the competitors' patent behaviour and innovation in the China market 
and the world market, foreign firms had to implement the same strategy to ensure the freedom 
of their business operation. Once a competitor has patented a technological innovation, this 
will prevent others from implementing control of technology innovation; further, it will affect 
the business operation freedom and strategic choice. This has been verified in the company 
level analysis. The consideration of business operation freedom will outweigh the imitation 
risk, especially for those companies that have advantages in technology (Keupp et al., 2012). 
On the other hand, there is similar competition in the Chinese patent market: the more the 
competitors of one country’s patents in China, the more that country will patent in China. The 
high influence coefficient (close to 0.34) explains the competition or the following behavior 
deciding the increasing foreign propensity to patent in China.  
At the same time, the decision is path- dependent, and has a significant relation with 
previous patent applications in China. In the dynamic view, the influence of domestic patent 
applications in China on foreign patent applications is positive, although it is not significant; 
From the result of parameter estimation on the static fixed effect model, the influence is 
significantly positive, indicating that there exists another competition threat in the Chinese 
patent market apart from the competition threat hypothesis in the Chinese sales markets, both 
of them can explain the phenomenon of the surge in foreign patenting  in China.  
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5. Extended discussion 
The main foreign patent applicants in China are foreign subsidiaries, and the trend and 
structure of competition in the Chinese sales market and patent market force them to 
implement the patent behavior, to drive the efficient interaction of these two markets to 
maintain a competitive advantage. Does foreign patent surge in China really mean more 
technology spillovers in local market? Liu and Ma (2012) measured the technology spillovers 
effect of multinational corporation patents in China during three periods in relation to the 
technology gap and the extent of competition. The results show that the technology spillovers 
to Chinese enterprises are decreased in a highly competitive market. The model of foreign 
patent spillovers transferring constructed by Zhang (2010) also suggests that foreign patent 
application spills little technology into the competitive eastern region. We try to characterize 
the competition situation in the patent market by the similarity of patent technology, judging 
whether the potential effect brought by patent market competition is consistent with the 
conclusion of technology spillover, which is promoted by the sales market competition.  
     The method of measuring the technology similarity is extended by the construction of a 
vector of technology similarity between countries (Jaffe 1986,1989), adopting about 400 
original patents classified by the USPTO as the dimension of technology vector,  which yields 
a low  value of similarity result (Jaffe, 1989).  Guo et al. (2007) use the R&D data instead of 
the patent data of Jaffe’s equation to construct the technology vector of 13 manufacturing sub-
industries; the value of similarity result is higher. From experience, the appropriate spatial 
vector dimension to measure the national technology similarity is between 30 and 50. 
Therefore, based on the method of Jaffe (1986) and Trajtenberg (1999), we construct 44 
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technology vectors according to the industry classification from Schmoch et al.（2003）, to 
measure the patent technology similarity Tprox between several main developed countries, as 
shown in formula (6). 






n=1 )⁄                          (6) 
      Where, 𝑓𝑛,𝑖,𝑡 , 𝑓𝑛,𝑗,𝑡   are the share of patents that country i and country j distributed to 
industry n in year t, respectively. The greater the overlaps of the patent distribution vector 
between two countries, the greater the technology similarity between two countries. If two 
vectors are orthogonal, the value is zero; if the two vectors are identical, the value is 1. Figure 
1 shows the tendency chart of three groups of technology similarity in 1986-2008, namely UC 
(the technology similarity of foreign patent grants in US and patent applications in China), C-
C (the technology similarity of foreign patent applications in China and Chinese domestic 
invention patent applications) and C-CUTILITY (the technology similarity of foreign patents 
application in China and Chinese domestic new utility patent applications).  
Figure 1  The tendency chart of technology similarity of three groups of from 1986-2008 
 













































































































As  Figure 1 shows, in the early years, compared with UC, C-C was much bigger, which 
reflects selection of technology closer to the Chinese market when foreign firms entered China 
early. Then, C-C fluctuates a little but the overall tendency is downward. From 1986 to 2001, 
C-C tends to decline, which means that the technology difference in patents between China 
and foreign countries was increasing. In fact, it is beneficial to obtain new external technology. 
Generally speaking, large technology similarity will help countries absorb technology from 
each other. At the same time, there will be fewer opportunities for achieving new technology 
owing to their much greater reliance on each other. In the same period of 1989-2001, UC 
increased steadily, reaching the maximum value in 2002, indicating that the self-innovation of 
foreign countries strongly supported their   patent applications in China. From 2002, UC 
gradually declined slightly again, and the technology difference between China and the USA 
is widened slightly. Almost simultaneously, C-C declined to a minimum, and then rose 
steadily. The increasing C-C reflects foreign enterprises’ well-understanding of the Chinese 
market with further entry and technology integration, which makes the patent technology 
distribution and development closer to domestic enterprise in China; but at the same time, the 
increase in technology similarity is not good in term of the opportunity for access to new 
external technology, such as the new technology in the US market. In addition, although C-
CUTILITY is the weakest (around 0.5), the whole structure tendency is rising continually. The 
new utility patent is not unique to China; it is well recognized that the utility patent is inferior 
to the invention patent in terms of innovation (Kim et al., 2012). Therefore, the increase C-C 
in China is not a good signal for China.  
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The analysis of technology similarity shows that the surge of foreign patents in China does 
not mean more opportunities for access to and acquirer of foreign advanced technology; on 
the contrary, the technology spillover is limited. Will the further strengthening competition of 
foreign countries in the Chinese goods market and patent market bring a reverse of technology 
similarity in favor of technology spillovers? This needs more evidence and analysis before a 
judgment can be formed. 
6. Conclusion 
The surge of foreign patenting in China leads us to consider two questions: Why are 
foreign countries enthusiastic to patent in China? Does this mean that more foreign technology 
in China has been spilled over the local market? We selected data from the China Intellectual 
Property Office and the United States Patent and Trademark Office separately (1985-2009), 
using industry level data from 19 countries and regions to inspect the market covering and 
competition threat hypotheses in China. The results shows that the competition between 
different foreign countries in the Chinese sales market and patent market support the 
competition threat hypothesis. In other words, foreign patent applications in China depend on 
the market decision and patent decision of competitor countries. In addition, foreign patent 
applications in China are related with its capacity of technology innovation, and also 
influenced significantly by the reform of the Chinese patent system. Furthermore, the extended 
discussion shows that the technology similarity of patents in both China and foreign countries 
improved greatly around 2001. It is easy for different countries to absorb technology by high 
technology similarity with each other. Meanwhile, the technology difference of foreign 
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countries in the Chinese market and American market has been widened slightly. The increase 
of foreign applications in China does not mean more opportunities for China to access and 








Appendix A. Industry classification  
18 industries 





Schmoch et al. 
44 industries 
Content 
1 1 15 1 Food, beverages 
2 16 2 Tobacco products 
2 3 17 3 Textiles 
4 18 4 Wearing apparel 
5 19 5 Leather articles 
3 6 20 6 
6 
Wood products 
4 7 21 7 Paper 
- - 22 8 Publishing and printing 
5 8 23 9 Petroleum products, nuclear fuel 
6 9 24-2423 10 Basic chemical 
11 Pesticides, agro-chemical products 
12 Paints, varnishes 
7 10 2423 13 Pharmaceuticals 
6 9 24-2423 14 Soaps, detergent, toilet preparations 
15 Other Chemicals 
16 Man-made fibres 
8 11 25 17 Rubber and plastics products 
9 12 26 18 Non-metallic mineral products 
10 13 27 19 Basic metals 
11 14 28 20 Fabricated metal products 
12 15 29 21 Energy machinery 
22 Non-specific purpose machinery 
23 Agricultural and forestry machinery 
24 Machine-tools 
25 Special purpose machinery 
26 Weapons and ammunition 
27 Domestic appliances 
13 16 30 28 Office machinery and computers 
14 17 31 29 Electric motors, generators, transformers  
30 Electric distribution, control, wire, cable 
31 Accumulators, battery 
32 Lightening equipment 
33 Other electrical equipment 
15 18 32 34 Electronic components 
35 Signal transmission, telecommunications 
36 Television and radio receivers, audiovisual electronics  
16 19 33 37 Medical equipment 
38 Measuring instruments 
39 Industrial process control equipment  
40 Optical instruments 
41 Watches, clocks 
17 20 34 42 Motor vehicles 
18 21 35 43 Other Vehicles  
- 22 36 44 Furniture, consumer goods 
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Appendix B. Preliminary study of factors influencing foreign patent applications 



















SIPO_china - - 0.243** 0.238** 0.016* 0.205** 0.044 -0.045 0.180** 
China_U - - -0.162** 0.052* 0.013 0.013 0.050* -0.071* -0.016 
SIPO_USA 0.207** -0.339** - 0.218** 0.324** 0.170** 0.208** 0.198** 0.097 
SIPO_Germany 0.209** 0.199** 0.129** - 0.249** -0.019 0.324** 0.116** -0.071* 
SIPO_France 0.066** 0.052 0.142** 0.184** - 0.135** 0.099** 0.011 0.047 
SIPO_Finlnd 0.070** 0.047 0.042** -0.008 0.077** - 0.053** 0.052 0.100** 
SIPO_Japan 0.076* 0.154** 0.167** 0.443** 0.183** 0.172** - 0.232** 0.079 
SIPO_Korea -0.037 -0.086** 0.066** 0.066** 0.008 0.07 0.096** - 0.398** 
SIPO_Taiwan 0.078** 0.027 0.033 -0.041 0.036 0.138** 0.033 0.407** - 
USPTO_china 0.090** -0.099** 0.015 0.005 0.083** 0.087* -0.03 0.055 -0.004 
USPTO_USA 0.478** 0.917** 0.517** -0.386** 0.044 -0.112 -0.157** 0.041 -0.185** 
USPTO_Germany -0.171** -0.358** -0.026 0.524** -0.096 0.184* -0.195** -0.167** -0.024 
USPTO_France -0.086* -0.069 -0.029 -0.107** 0.329** -0.128* 0.007 -0.182** -0.044 
USPTO_Finland 0.063** 0.091** -0.071** 0.023 -0.041 0.377** -0.056** -0.055 0.113** 
USPTO_Japan -0.103** -0.155** 0.04 -0.165** -0.095* -0.191** 0.410** -0.143** -0.181** 
USPTO_Korea -0.054** -0.163** -0.03 -0.057 0.002 -0.085 0.072** 0.550** -0.005 
USPTO_Taiwan -0.155** 0.663** -0.069** 0.041 -0.086* -0.034 0.043 -0.022 0.511** 
Institution 0.484** 0.588** 0.165* -0.087 -0.084 0.065 0.410** -0.199 0.397** 
Obs. 1032 1032 1032 1032 1032 1032 1032 1032 1032 
R square 0.823 0.738 0.898 0.867 0.834 0.705 0.911 0.864 0.846 
Note 1: SIPO_USA represents the American application in Chinese intellectual Property Office, 
USPTO_USA represents the American patent authorization in America patent and Trademark 
Office. The definition of corresponding variables is similar in other countries and regions. 
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